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In this review, the authors discuss the seemingly paradoxical loss of control associated
with states of high readiness to execute a plan, termed “intention-based reﬂexivity.” The
review suggests that the neuro-cognitive systems involved in the preparation of novel
plans are different than those involved in preparation of practiced plans (i.e., those that
have been executed beforehand). When the plans are practiced, intention-based reﬂexivity
depends on the prior availability of response codes in long-term memory (LTM). When
the plans are novel, reﬂexivity is observed when the plan is pending and the goal has
not yet been achieved. Intention-based reﬂexivity also depends on the availability of
working-memory (WM) limited resources and the motivation to prepare. Reﬂexivity is
probably related to the fact that, unlike reactive control (once a plan is prepared), proactive
control tends to be relatively rigid.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyday experience suggests that planning may be useful. For
example, when going on a trip abroad, it is usually recom-
mended to book the ﬂights, trains and hotels ahead of the trip.
Nonetheless, planning is taxing and advance booking requires
precious time and effort. Importantly in the present context,
advance booking comes at the cost of reduced ﬂexibility since
o n em a yn o tb ea b l et oc h a n g et h eh o t e l ,w h e nﬁ n d i n go u tu p o n
arrival that a better and cheaper hotel is nearby. This conﬂict
between costs and beneﬁts is even more pronounced when plan-
ning takes place in parallel with other demanding activities. For
example, toward the end of a talk in a conference, one may plan
herorhisquestion,yet thisveryattemptmightpreventtheperson
from truly listening to the end of the talk. These informal obser-
vations are supported by laboratory research on simple plans.
This research suggests that planning (i.e., preparedness) improves
action ﬂuency and accuracy, resistance to interference (Braver
et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) and the ability to overcome persever-
ative tendencies (Meiran and Daichman, 2005; Koch and Allport,
2006).Atthe sametime, planningandholdingplansinmindhave
been shown to consume limited processing resources, and thus
interfere with other ongoing activity (e.g., Fagot, 1994; Meiran,
2000; Braver et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). Moreover, the fact that
planning improves resistance to interference may actually prevent
us from processing highly relevant information (e.g., Goschke
and Dreisbach, 2008).
In the present work, we discuss an additional drawback of
planning, the seemingly paradoxical loss of ﬂexible online action
control when the action plan is still pending. We describe this
lossofcontrol as“intention-based reﬂexivity,” orsimply“reﬂexiv-
ity.” By “reﬂexivity” we mean that a cognitive process is triggered
even when it is not required or intended at the given moment (see
also how Bargh and Gollwitzer, 1994; Tzelgov, 1997; Bargh et al.,
2001, characterize “automaticity”). Although it may seem self
contradictory to refer to the unintended aspects of intended acts,
there is no contradiction here. This is because the unintended
(possibly partial) execution of the plan may take place prema-
turely, i.e., before the intended execution, when the plan is still
pending1. Intention-based reﬂexivity can potentially have quite
dramatic real life consequences such as when a policeman is aim-
ing a gun in anticipation for an attack and accidentally shoots at
a civilian who innocently passes by. In the lab, intention-based
reﬂexivity can be studied with simple plans in which a given
stimulus or a stimulus-category is linked to a particular planned
response. An example for such a plan is to press the right key if
the letter is from the beginning of the alphabet and press the left
key if the letter is from the end of the alphabet.
NOVEL PLANS, PRACTICED PLANS, AND WORKING-MEMORY
Since plans must be stored and represented in memory, it is crit-
ical to consider the likely memory system that is involved. Based
on considerations that are detailed below, we distinguish between
novel plans and practiced plans. Novel plans are plans that have
never been executed beforehand, such as the plan to write this
paper or the plan to execute a reaction time task for the ﬁrst time.
Practiced plans areplansthathavebeenexecuted beforehand,such
as the plan to execute a familiar reaction time task, reach the
ofﬁce, or prepare an omelet. We argue that the kind of processes
involved in representing andstoring novel andpracticed plansare
different from one another in important respects. Consequently,
1We use the term “reﬂexivity” instead of the term “automaticity,” because the
latter term usually refers to practiced skill and to conditions in which the
process is not a part of a pending plan.
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the conditions that produce reﬂexivity in novel plans are quite
different from the conditions that produce reﬂexivity in familiar
plans.
The tenet of this paper is that plans are stored in working-
memory (WM). However, it is widely appreciated that WM is not
a unitary system and there are several different theories describ-
ing its subsystems (e.g., Miyake and Shah, 1999). We decided
to adopt Oberauer’s (2001, 2002, 2010)m o d e l[ w h i c hm a yb e
viewed as an extension of Cowan’s (1988), model] because of the
natural link to reﬂexivity which this model affords. Following
Oberauer, we consider WM as comprising: (1) novel bindings
between familiar elements (“region of direct-access,” RA) which
is a severely limited resource; and (2) temporary heightened
accessibility (activation) of familiar representations in long-term
memory(LTM), termed “activated LTM” (ALTM), which is much
less limited in its capacity(seeFigure1). Similardistinctions have
been drawn in neuroscience by other theorists including Ruchkin
et al. (2003);P o s t l e(2006); Jonides et al. (2008), Bledowski et al.,
2010, all suggesting that WM consists of an interaction between
attentional systems subserved mostly by prefrontal cortex (PFC)
regions and other brain regions involved in perception, semantic
processing and action. The link to reﬂexivity which Oberauer’s
model affords is related to the fact that, according to Oberauer
(2001), RA and ALTM differ not only in their capacity but also in
their context sensitivity. While RA is highly sensitive to context,
ALTM is not sensitive to context and operates even in inappro-
priate contexts, i.e., reﬂexively. To appreciate this link we describe
here how Oberauer (2001) operationalized RA and ALTM. In the
aforementioned work, Oberauer asked participants to memorize
two lists of words and cued them in each trial which list is cur-
rently relevant. Following the cue and after a variable interval,
a word was presented and the participants’ task was to indicate
if this probe was a member in the relevant list. Reaction times
increased with increasing memory set size, indicating capacity
limitations. Additionally, the size of the irrelevant list ceased to
affect performance when sufﬁcient time (1s or more) elapsed
between thecueandthe probe,providinganopportunityto focus
FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation of (our interpretation of)
Oberauer’s (2001, 2002) model. According to this model,
working-memory comprises activated long-term memory representations.
The region of direct-access consists of novel bindings between a sub-group
of activated long-term memory representations.
on the relevant list. This result is interpreted as evidence that
once the participants knew which one of the two lists is relevant,
they focused on this list and removed the irrelevant list from RA.
As soon as the irrelevant list was removed from RA it ceased to
consume its resources.
The most important ﬁnding for the present focus is the intru-
sion effect which, according to Oberauer (2001)i n d e x e sA L T M .
T h i se f f e c ts h o w st h a td e s p i t ef o c u s i n go nt h er e l e v a n tl i s ta n d
removing the irrelevant list from RA, participants had difﬁculty
rejecting itemsthatbelongedtotheirrelevantlist.Thisresultindi-
cates that this irrelevant list, while being outside RA, remained
highly accessible. In detail, the intrusion effect was deﬁned as
the difference in the time taken to reject items from the irrele-
vant list as compared with completely new items. The intrusion
effect was relatively insensitive to set size and the time to focus
on the relevant list. Importantly, according to our deﬁnition, the
intrusion effect indicates the reﬂexive processing of words that
belonged to the irrelevant list and thus serves to link ALTM and
reﬂexivity.
THE REPRESENTATION OF PLANS IN WORKING-MEMORY
We now turn to use the distinction between RA and ALTM
to describe our hypothesis regarding how plans are represented
in WM. Before doing so, we further assume that, because RA
resources are scarce (e.g., Cowan, 2001) (1) the use of this
resource is avoided as much as possible, and (2) including purg-
ing its contents as soon as they become irrelevant or as soon as
they can be represented in ALTM.
Based on these considerations, we argue that essential com-
ponents of novel plans are represented within RA, at least when
these plans are meant to be executed in the near future. In order
to clarify what we mean by “essential components” let us con-
sider for example the plan to hit the right key in response to a
letter from the beginning of the alphabet(see Figure2). This plan
has two elements that can be represented in ALTM: the concept
FIGURE 2 | An example for a representation of a simple rule such as IF
(the stimulus is a letter from the beginning of the alphabet) THEN
(press the right key). When the instructions are given, the long-term
memory representations of “letter,” “beginning of the alphabet” and
“right” are activated. The novel binding between “beginning of the
alphabet” and “right” (presented in green color) is in the region of
direct-access. When a letter such as “b” is presented, it activates its
corresponding representation in long-term memory. Via links in long-term
memory, the representation of “beginning of the alphabet” is also further
activated, leading to the activation of “right” (via the novel link) and to the
key press (via established links in long-term memory).
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“right key” and the concept “letter belonging to the beginning
of the alphabet.” The reason is that these are familiar concepts,
hence concepts that are stored in LTM. Based on our assumptions
regarding sparing of RA resources, we assume that the represen-
tation of these elements is taking place within ALTM. However
the link between them is novel and must thus be stored in RA.
Had this plan been executed beforehand, all the elements of the
plan would have been familiar (represented in LTM) and thus the
entire plan could be in ALTM. This would be especially true for
plans that have been executed at least several times in the past.
Thus, while the entire plan can be represented in ALTM when the
plan is practiced and familiar, only parts of it can be represented
in this system when the planis newandsome elements ofthe plan
must consume the limited RA resources.
REFLEXIVITY OF PRACTICED PLANS
Hommel (2000) provides an extensive review of the evidence for
plan reﬂexivity, which at the time, was exclusively demonstrated
using lengthy experiments. Because the experiments were lengthy
and the plansremained the samethroughout theexperiment, one
cannot rule out the possibility that the effects reﬂected practiced
rather than novel plans. In the present review, we focus on evi-
dence (1) linking reﬂexivity to intention and (2) showing that
reﬂexivity of practiced plans depends on ALTM.
An important piece of evidence concerning reﬂexivity of prac-
ticed plans comes from the task-rule congruency effect found
in task-switching experiments. This effect has been ﬁrst demon-
strated by Sudevan and Taylor (1987) who asked participants
to switch between 2 numerical tasks performed on digits: size
(larger/smaller that 5)andparity. Importantly (1)both tasks were
executed on the same set of stimuli (the digits 1–9), and (2) the
same right-left keys were used. Thus, there were trials in which
the two task-rules were associated with the same response (com-
patible) or with competing responses (incompatible). Sudevan
and Taylor found poorer performance in incompatible trials as
compared to compatible trials (although this effect was restricted
to the parity task). This result shows that, when the parity task
was relevant, the currently irrelevant size rule operated reﬂex-
ively and activated the response that would have been correct
had this rule been relevant. Thus, the task-rule congruency effect
provides evidence for the reﬂexivity of the currently irrelevant
task and is quite analogous to Oberauer’s (2001) intrusion effect.
Speciﬁcally, in both cases, information that is currently irrelevant
but may become relevant in the near future inﬂuences perfor-
mance reﬂexively. Since this demonstration, there were numerous
additional papers that reported this effect (e.g., see Meiran and
Kessler, 2008, for a partial review). In this section, we focus on
two main issues. One is the evidence linking the task-rule con-
gruency effect (and similar effects) to the intention to execute
a given task. The other provides evidence for the involvement
of ALTM.
LINKING THE REFLEXIVITY OF PRACTICED PLANS TO INTENTION
While the task-rule congruency effect shows that the irrelevant
rule operated reﬂexively, its mere presence does not indicate that
this reﬂexivity is related to the intention to execute this rule. An
alternative explanation is that the initial execution of this rule
(even during the practice phase of the experiment) leads to the
formation of LTM traces, which are known to generate reﬂexivity
(e.g., Logan, 1988). An important piece of evidence linking task-
rule congruency effect to intention is the fact that this effect
greatly diminishes as soon as participants are told that the task
would no longer be required. This result has been demonstrated
by several authors including Fagot (1994);M e i r a n(2000, 2005);
Yehene and Meiran (2007); Yamaguchi and Proctor (2011).
Another important demonstration comes from Marble and
Proctor (2000,s e ea l s oProctor et al., 2000)w h oc o m p a r e dp e r -
formance in the Simon task (Lu and Proctor, 1995,f o rr e v i e w )
in three conditions. In one condition (“pure Simon”) partici-
pants reacted to the color of stimuli by pressing right and left
keys. They had to ignore the irrelevant location of the stim-
uli. In this condition, a usual Simon effect was found, showing
quicker responses when the (irrelevant) location of the stimulus
and the location of the responding hand were compatible rather
than incompatible. In the critical conditions, the Simon task was
intermixed with a location task, which required participants to
respond to right-left locations of white stimuli. In one version
of the paradigm, the location task was compatible (e.g., if the
location is on the right, press the right key) and in the other
version of the paradigm it was incompatible (if the location is
on the right, press the left key). Marble and Proctor found that,
relative to the pure Simon condition, the Simon effect increased
(actually, roughly doubled) when the color task was intermixed
with a compatible location task. We interpret this result as evi-
dence that being prepared to execute the location task resulted in
reﬂexive application of this plan even in the color task, when it
was not required. Interestingly, the Simon effect (observed in the
color task) was reversed when the location task was incompati-
ble. This latter result has two important implications. One is that
intention-based reﬂexivity may sometimes be more potent than
automatic behaviors (indicated in the standard Simon effect).
Speciﬁcally, when the Simon task wasintermixed with the incom-
patible location task, the intention to execute the location task
generated a tendency for reversed Simon effect while the auto-
matic tendency was to generate a usual Simon effect. In this case,
these two tendencies were opposite in direction and the fact that
the intention-based tendency dominated suggests that it is more
potent than the automatic tendency. The other implication of
the reversed Simon effect is that mixing the color task and the
location task did not only result in quicker processing of loca-
tion information in general. If this were true, the Simon effect
should have increased even when the location task was incompat-
ible. The fact that the Simon effect had reversed indicates that the
instructed link between locations and responses (rather than just
location information) became reﬂexive. Memelink and Hommel
(2006) ran a similar study but instead of using one location task,
they embedded the Simon trials in blocks in which the other
task involved switching between up-down and right-left classi-
ﬁcation of locations. They showed that the horizontal Simon
effect increased when the Simon task immediately followed
right-left judgments and that the vertical Simon effect increased
when it immediately followed up-down judgments. These results
further demonstrate the dependence of reﬂexivity on (prior)
intention.
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REFLEXIVITY OF PRACTICED PLANS DEPENDS ON ALTM
As mentioned beforehand, we argue that the mere representa-
tion of a plan in ALTM provides a sufﬁcient condition for its
reﬂexivity. Thus, the boundary conditions for reﬂexivity in this
case are the same boundary conditions for ALTM representation,
namely the prior existence of LTM codes. Meiran and Kessler
(2008) noted that the task-rule congruency effect is analogous in
many respects to Oberauer’s (2001) intrusion effect in the sense
that information that is currently irrelevant (butmaybecome rel-
evantsoon) isprocessednonetheless. Tosubstantiate this analogy,
they compared two task-switching paradigms (see Figure3). In
one paradigm, participants made up-down and right-left judg-
ments on the location of a target stimulus within a 2 × 2g r i d .
The responses that were used were the upper-left key (used to
i n d i c a t eU Pa n dL E F T )a n dt h el o w e r - r i g h tk e y( u s e dt oi n d i -
cate DOWN and RIGHT). In this condition, the task-rules were
presumably associated with the LTM-stored codes UP, DOWN,
RIGHT, and LEFT. In the other version of the paradigm, the dis-
play was rotated by 45◦ as was the arrangement of the response
keys. This rotation maintained the spatial relations of the stimuli,
the responses, and the compatibility between responses and their
corresponding locations. However, the regions within the 2 × 2
grid were no longer associated with the familiar (LTM-based) UP,
DOWN, RIGHT, and LEFT regions. They probably were quite
novel. The results showed that performance in this condition
was slightly impaired relative to the standard, upright condition.
The critical ﬁndings refer to the task-rule congruency effect. This
effect was robust in the standard condition (∼90ms), showing
that being prepared to execute one task-rule results in a reﬂexive
FIGURE 3 | The displays and response-key arrangement used by
Meiran and Kessler (2008). (A) The standard display. Participants switched
between classifying locations according to a vertical rule (UP vs. DOWN)
and a horizontal rule (right vs. left, presented in the ﬁgure). The two keys
used to respond were associated with UP and LEFT (Key 1) and DOWN and
RIGHT (Key 2). The target in this case is incongruent because wrongly
applying the vertical rule would have led to an incorrect response (Key 1)
instead of the correct Key 2 response. (B) A4 5 ◦ rotation of the display and
the key arrangement in which the classiﬁcation rules involved novel location
terms. Here, too, the target is incongruent in the same sense as in (A).
application ofthat rulewhen the other task-ruleis required. Most
importantly, there was no task-rule congruency effect whatsoever
(0ms) in the rotated condition. This result shows that the reﬂex-
ivity of the plan depends on the prior availability of task-related
response codes (such as UP and LEFT) in LTM and is absent
when these response codes are novel. In a further experiment,
the authors showed that the task-rule congruency effect in the
rotated condition was re-established after one session of practice
and remained stable in the remaining sessions. Arguably, prac-
tice resulted in the storage of the formerly novel response codes
in LTM. Thus, from Session 2 onward, this aspect of the plan was
represented in ALTM.
There are two additional pieces of evidence that reﬂexivity of
practiced plans depends on their representation in ALTM. The
ﬁrst line of evidence is insensitivity to preparation. Speciﬁcally,
Oberauer (2001) showed that the intrusion effect (that opera-
tionalized ALTM) was insensitive to the amount of time provided
to focus on the relevant word list (and ignore the irrelevant
list). Likewise, the task-rulecongruencyeffect hasrepeatedly been
shown to be insensitive to the amount of time allowed to focus
on the relevant task and ignore the irrelevant task (e.g., Sudevan
and Taylor, 1987;s e ea l s oFagot, 1994; Meiran, 1996, 2000, 2005;
Meiran et al., 2000;b u ts e eSudevan and Taylor, 1987,r e g a r d -
ing preparation-based reduction in task-rule congruency effect
afterextensive practice).Similarly,asdescribedabove,Marbleand
Proctor (2000) showed thatthe Simoneffect increased in the con-
text of a compatible location task and reversed in the context of
an incompatiblelocation task. Importantly, they also showed that
the effects remained even when participants received cues indi-
cating which task is currently in effect. This last result shows that
participants were unable to remove the plan to execute the loca-
tion task from ALTM just as Oberauer’s (2001)p a r t i c i p a n t sw e r e
unable to remove the irrelevant list from ALTM.
The last piece of evidence is the lack of sensitivity of the
task-rule congruency effect to WM load, a manipulation which
presumably exhausts RA limited resources. The rationale here is
that if the exhaustion of RA resources does not inﬂuence the task-
rule congruency effect then this effect must be based on other
forms of representation. In detail, Kiesel et al. (2007) studied the
task-rule congruency effect in an experiment involving 2 numer-
ical tasks (magnitude and parity). The trials were executed in the
retention interval of 2 vs. 5 letters (the WM load manipulation).
These authors found that this load manipulation, while being
effective (seen in generally poorer performance) did not inﬂu-
ence the task-rule congruency effect. Kessler and Meiran (2010)
raised the possibility that the load task used by Kiesel et al. might
have been ineffective because it may have involved a different
WM compartment as that used to store the task plans (Oberauer,
2010, see below). Thus, they used additional tasks as their load
manipulation instead of memorizing items. In their experiments,
the task-rule congruency effect was measured in the shape and
color tasks, performed on colored shapes. The load tasks were 1
or 3 numeric tasks, performed on digits (Experiments 1 and 2)
or size, ﬁll and line thickness tasks, performed on completely
different shapes. In none of the experiments was there a modu-
lation of the task-rule congruency effect under heavier load, thus
substantiating Kiesel et al.’s (2007)c o n c l u s i o n s .
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REFLEXIVITY OF NOVEL PLANS
According to prevalent theorizing (e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin,
1977; Logan, 1988), reﬂexivity/automaticity results from exten-
sive and consistent practice. These theories do not postulate
reﬂexivity for novel plans. Moreover, Oberauer’s (2001)t h e o r y
link reﬂexivity to ALTM but not to the RA. These considera-
tions suggest that plans in RA might not be reﬂexive. However,
there is a much older theory in psychology, Prepared-Reﬂex
(PR) (Exner, 1879; Woodworth, 1938;s e eLogan, 1978; Hommel,
2000), suggesting that reﬂexivity of novel plans is not only pos-
sible, but may actually represent the typical scenario (see e.g.,
Folk et al., 1992, 1993, 1994; Remington and Folk, 2001; Pratt
and Hommel, 2003, for related ideas concerning the direction
of attention. See Bekkering and Neggers, 2002; Fagioli et al.,
2007a,b; Wykowska et al., 2009, for evidence suggesting that
reﬂexive attention orientation may actually represent reﬂexive
action-intentions, as reviewed by Hommel, 2010). According to
the PR theory, the representation of novel plans in RA in advance
of task execution maybe sufﬁcient to cause these plans to become
reﬂexive.
There have only been a few studies that have examined the
reﬂexivity of truly novel plans. The few that did have provided
evidence favoring the PR theory by showing that novel plans can
be reﬂexive. These studies also suggest some important boundary
conditions for novel plan reﬂexivity. We review them chrono-
logically. As can be seen, the methodology improved gradually,
allowing various alternative explanations to be more carefully
ruled out.
de Houwer et al. (2005, Experiment 2) adopted an approach
in which plan reﬂexivity was measured when the participants
held the plan active in anticipation of its execution. Speciﬁcally,
these authors instructed participants to be ready to react to the
words “right” and “left” (as well as to equivalent arrows) with
the utterances “bee” and “boo.” They additionally asked the par-
ticipants to use these same responses to indicate the color in
which rectangles were presented. These rectangles appeared on
the right or on the left despite of the fact that location was irrele-
vant. Importantly, during task performance there were actually
no location words or arrows presented, meaning that the plan
to react to location information was not practiced. Of interest
was whether holding in mind the novel plan to react to locations
with utterances would be reﬂexive. Reﬂexivity was measured in
the color task by comparing compatible and incompatible trials,
deﬁned according to whether the reaction to (the irrelevant) loca-
tion would have been the same as that for (the relevant) color.
de Houwer et al. found a signiﬁcant compatibility effect in their
experiment (compatible RT < incompatible RT), indicating the
reﬂexivity of the plan to react to locations. The major limita-
tion of this study has to do with the fact that the plan might
not have been truly novel and that reﬂexivity was built in the
course of the experiment. This could have happened if the par-
ticipants occasionally(and erroneously) reacted to the location of
the colors instead of reacting to colors. A similar criticism (with
respect to plan novelty) applies to studies that have examined
subliminal response priming effects, which are not reviewed here
(e.g.,Eimer andSchlaghecken,1998;Kundeetal.,2003). Showing
a compatibility effect immediately (i.e., in the very ﬁrst-trials)
after the task was instructed would have ruled out this possibility.
Below we review two series of studies in which this prerequisite
was met.
Wenke et al. (2007) asked participants to be prepared to exe-
cute a new speeded letter classiﬁcation task in each trial (Task 2).
Thistaskinvolvedanarbitrarymappingoftwoletters tothe right-
left key presses (e.g., N → left, K → right). Of interest is that,
while being prepared to execute this letter classiﬁcation task, the
participants were given another task (Task 1) in which a pair of
letters in different sizes was presented (e.g., “NK”). This task was
introduced in order to assess plan reﬂexivity with responses indi-
cated bypressing the spacebar once or twice. In Experiment 1, the
participants were required to indicate the location of the larger
letter in the pair while in Experiment 2 they indicated the color in
which the largerletter waspresented. Therewere compatible(e.g.,
“NK”), incompatible (e.g., “KN”) and neutral (e.g., “FB”) trials.
The results indicated slightly quicker reactions to compatible tri-
alsthanincompatible trials, andwere thusinterpreted asevidence
that the instructions were sufﬁcient to bind letter identity and
response location (e.g., bind the letter “N”w i t ht h el e f ts i d e ) .
However, these results do not provide evidence that the instruc-
tions for the letter classiﬁcation task (Task 1) operated reﬂexively.
This is partly because the responses in Task 2 (right vs. left key
press) were different than the responses in Task 1 (single vs. dou-
ble press of the space bar), meaning that Task 1 did not enable the
full application of Task 2 instructions.
Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran (2007)s t u d yo v e r c o m e st h e
aforementioned shortcoming. These authors used a variant ofthe
ﬂankerparadigm(EriksenandEriksen, 1974)in which acentrally
presented target was ﬂanked by response-(in)compatible noise
characters that were always physically different from the target.
For example, when classifying target letters as belonging to the
beginning/end of the alphabet, the stimuli “WBW” and “EBE”
are incompatibleand compatible,respectively. While the required
response (“beginning of the alphabet”) is the same in both of
them because the target letter is “B,” this target is ﬂanked by let-
ters that are either associated with the same response as the target
(“E”) or with an opposite response (“W”) (see Figure4). The
novel aspect about Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran’s design was that
a new stimulus set (and stimulus-response binding) was intro-
duced in every experimental block. The key ﬁnding was a large
(∼60ms) ﬂanker compatibility effect (called ﬁrst-trials ﬂanker
compatibilityeffect, or“ﬁrst-trialscompatibilityeffect,” forshort)
that was found in the ﬁrst block of eight trials immediately fol-
lowing the instructions. By introducing additional procedural
changes, Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran (2009) further showed that
the ﬁrst-trial compatibility effect was found in the very ﬁrst-trial
following the instructions, andthat it wasnumerically larger than
the compatibilityeffect in subsequenttrials in the ﬁrstmini-block
of trials. This ﬁrst-trial(s) compatibility effect indicates reﬂexivity
because the processing of the ﬂankers led to response activation
despite the explicit requirement to ignore them. It also overcomes
the issue of plan novelty, since the effect was measured imme-
diately after the instructions. Additionally, the methodology is
improved over the Wenke et al.’s (2007) study, because in that
study the compatible condition constituted a physical represen-
tation of the instructions in the sense that the letter associated
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FIGURE 4 | The display used by Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran (2007).
(A) The participants were required to respond to the central letter and
ignore the ﬂanking letters. A new rule was instructed in each experimental
block. This rule was (for example) to press the right key if the letter came
from the beginning of the alphabet and to press the left key if it came from
the end of the alphabet. The stimulus in the ﬁgure is incongruent because
the ﬂankers are associated with a competing response (Congruent displays
could be “DBD,” for example). (B) The representation of the instructions,
according to our framework consists of activated long-term memory and
the region of direct-access (in green), as in Figure 2.
with the right key appeared on the right and the letter associated
with the left key appeared on the left. This aspect makes it pos-
sible that the quicker (slower) responses reﬂected a (mis)match
between the display and the instructions. No such criticism could
apply to Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran’s experiments. Thus, there
is greater conﬁdence that the representation of the instructions in
RA has reﬂexively generated a response tendency (or at least, the
response identity, e.g., see Hommel, 1998)f o rt h eﬂ a n k e r se v e n
before those ﬂankers had ever been practiced as a target response.
Nonetheless, there still remainsanalternativeexplanation accord-
ingto which the ﬂankersprimedtargetidentityprocessing (rather
than have caused response generation). This alternative account
holds because the ﬂankers were semantically associated with the
target (e.g., both belonged to the beginning of the alphabet).
We do not think this alternative account is likely to be correct
because the ﬂanker compatibility effects quickly diminished in
the course of the block, a trend that is not expected for semantic
priming.
Finally, there is one study that tried but failed to show evi-
dence for novel plan reﬂexivity. The ﬁndings of this study point
to important boundary conditions for novel plan reﬂexivity as
discussed below. Waszak et al. (2008)e m p l o y e dat a s k - s w i t c h i n g
design in which participants switched between colorclassiﬁcation
andshapeclassiﬁcation.Importantly,someofthe(irrelevant)col-
ors used in the shape task and some of the (irrelevant) shapes
that were used in the color task were only instructed and were
never presented as targets. These authors found a reliable task-
rule congruency effect. However, the task-rule congruency effect
was only found for the irrelevant features that also were pre-
sented as targets (in other trials), but not for the irrelevant
features that were merely instructed (and never responded to as
targets). Thus, holding the plan to react to a given color/shape in
a certain manner was insufﬁcient for the reﬂexive application of
this plan. The potential reasons for this null ﬁnding are discussed
now.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
The extant literature suggests three boundary conditions for
the reﬂexivity of novel plans. The ﬁrst is the availability of RA
storage resources. The second boundary condition is that the
planned task and the task in which reﬂexivity is measured must
be considered to be part of the same processing event. The ﬁnal
condition is the motivation to maintain high preparedness to exe-
cute the planned task. We will discuss each one of these factors
in turn.
Availability of RA storage resources
The fact that RA storage resources must be available has
been demonstrated by Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran (2007,
Experiment 4) who showed that the ﬁrst-trial compatibility effect
was eliminated when RA was loaded by secondary task instruc-
tions. Speciﬁcally, in addition to instructing participants to carry
out a new classiﬁcation task, each block also included a novel
go-nogo to be performed on rare occasions. This task involved
clearlydistinguishable target stimuli (numbers or number words)
and required a “go” response (pressing the spacebar with both
thumbs) if the stimulus met a certain criterion (such as being
divisible by 3). In these conditions, the ﬁrst-trial compatibil-
ity effect was eliminated, suggesting that only when the novel
plan is held in its entirety in RA, reﬂexivity is found. We have
recently addressed an alternative account to this ﬁnding accord-
ing to which the load task did not exhaust storage space, but
instead merely introduced increased multitasking demands. In
ordertoruleoutthisaccount,MeiranandCohen-Kdoshay(2012)
compared three groups of participants. In one group, there was
no additional load. This group showed the usual ﬁrst-trial com-
patibility effect. In another group, there was a load task that
was changed between blocks, as in Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran
(2007) fourth experiment. The ﬁrst-trial compatibility effect was
eliminated (actually, slightly reversed) in this group, thus repli-
cating our previous work. Of interest is the third group in which
the go-nogo task remained the same throughout the experiment.
In this group, the load task increased multitasking demands but
did not load RA (because the load task could have been repre-
sented in ALTM). This group showed a ﬁrst-trial compatibility
effect thatwasequivalentto thatfound in the groupwithoutload.
These results show that what is critical is the representation of the
plan in RA.
Ellenbogen and Meiran (2008) studied the involvement of RA
in the backward compatibility effect (Hommel, 1998). In their
experiments, participants made speeded responses to the letters
H and S presented in different colors. The primary task was color
classiﬁcationwhich wasmadeusingrightandleftkeypresses. The
secondary task that was executed immediately afterwards was let-
terclassiﬁcationinwhichthe(arbitrarilymapped)responseswere
the (Hebrew equivalents) ofthe utterances REDandGREEN.The
logic was that executing Task 1 while being prepared to execute
Task 2 would lead to compatibility effects such that if the color of
the stimulus is the same as the utterance made to letter identity,
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reaction would be relatively quick. This compatibility effect was
termed “backward compatibility” by Hommel. Of interest is the
load manipulation used in this study, which was the number of
possible colors (and thus, the number of color-key associations).
When the load was low (two colors) or moderate (four colors)
there was arobustbackwardcompatibilityeffect (thus completely
replicating Hommel and Eglau, 2002). However, when the load
was extreme (six colors) the backward compatibility effect was
eliminated. In a further experiment, the authors showed that the
critical factor was not the number of colors, but the number of
color-category—to—response rules. The fact that extreme load
was needed to eliminate reﬂexivity already provides evidence that
afew dozensof executions are sufﬁcientto reduce the dependence
on RA such that extreme load is needed in order to remove plan
reﬂexivity.
Inclusion in an event
We suggest the principle that if a person has a plan in mind to
execute a task, this forms an event which lasts from the point
of planning to the point of plan execution. We will refer to it
as the plan-to-execution event. We further suggest that the mea-
surement of reﬂexivity of a plan must take place during the
plan-to-execution event.
Although the term “event” is rather elusive, there is marked
agreement between observers regarding event boundaries, and
considerable objective support for the psychological reality of
these boundaries (e.g., Zacks et al., 2007). Our notion regarding
plan-to-execution events is supported by ﬁndings from this liter-
ature includingthose indicating that a goalchange demarksevent
boundaries (Zacks and Swallow, 2007) and the evidence suggest-
ing that the contents of RA are refreshed (i.e., updated) at these
boundaries (e.g., Swallowet al., 2009) presumably in order to free
these scarce resources as soon as possible.
Ellenbogen and Meiran (2011) showed evidence that plan
reﬂexivity takes place only during the plan-to-execution event.
These authors used the backward compatibility effect (described
above) as an index of reﬂexivity. In this paradigm, the rele-
vant plan-to-execution event (of Task 2) presumably starts before
Task 1 is executed, when participants are ready to execute both
tasksinclosesuccession.However,subtleenvironmentalcuesmay
be sufﬁcient to start planning for Task 2 only after Task 1 has
already been performed. We speciﬁcally refer to cues indicating
that a goal has been achieved. In one of Ellenbogen and Meiran’s
experiments (see Figure5), participants were presented with a
colored square and a digit. They then reacted to the color by
a right/left key press and to the magnitude of the digit by say-
ing “right” or “left.” After responding to both of these stimuli
(Tasks 1 and 2, respectively), a second digit was presented and
Task 3 was performed. Like in Ellenbogen and Meiran (2008)
study, described above, Task 1 was used to assess the reﬂexivity
of the plan to execute Task 2 because Task 2 responses (saying
“right” or “left”) were either compatible or incompatible with the
keypressmadeinTask1. Task3 wasaddedinorderto manipulate
the duration of the plan-to-execution event. In the experimen-
tal group (“grouped”), the color of the square indicated whether
Task 3 would involve adding the two digits or subtracting the
third digit from the second digit. Under these conditions, color
FIGURE 5 | Ellenbogen and Meiran’s (2011) fourth experiment. (A)
Stimuli 1 and 2 were ﬁrst presented, then Responses 1 (key press) and 2
(vocal) were given, then Stimulus 3 was added, then Response 3 was
given. The color in Stimulus 1 indicated if Task 3 was addition or subtraction
(or the +/− sign in the ungrouped condition). (B) The representation of the
instructions for Tasks 1 and 2 according to our framework were held as a
blend of activated long-term memory (the concepts written in black as well
as overlearned links between them) and region of direct-access (green).
processing (Task1) belonged to the sameplan-to-execution event
as Task 2 because this event ended only when Task 3 has been
executed. In the control group, the colored square did not serve
as a task cue for the two digits and thus Task 1 belonged to one
event while Task 2 and Task 3 belonged to different event. (In this
group,the cue forTask 3 wasa minus or a plussign that appeared
below the second digit.) Because the second digit (the stimulus
for Task 3) was presented only after the response to Task 2 was
made, the display and the tasks were identical for the two groups
until Task 2 ended, which is when backward compatibility effects
were assessed in order to measure plan reﬂexivity. The results
indicated a backwardcompatibility effect (in Task 1, as usual)but
onlyinthe experimental groupand notinthe control group. This
result shows that the plan to execute Task 2 (whose reﬂexivity was
assessed) wasretrieved into RAonlywhenTask1(in which reﬂex-
ivity was assessed) wasa part ofthe same plan-to-execute eventas
Task 2.
Motivation
The motivation to hold the plan in mind seems important as
well because when motivation is lacking, the plan may not be
represented in RA, for example. To our knowledge, the only
motivation-relevant ﬁndings are by Wenke et al. (2009)u s i n g
the same paradigm as Wenke et al. (2007), described above.
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Wenke et al. (2009) compared conditions that are associated with
differential motivation levels to prepare an action in advance.
For example, one such condition involved frequent omission of
the requirement to execute the plan. Speciﬁcally, their paradigm
involved preparing for a choice reaction time task (Task 2) and
executing another task (Task 1) that was used to assess plan
reﬂexivity. When Task 2 was frequently omitted, this presum-
ably lowered participants’ motivation to prepare toward this task.
Accordingly, there was no evidence that the plan to execute Task 2
was reﬂexive in these conditions. These results suggest that being
motivated to maintain high readiness to execute a task is a pre-
condition for reﬂexivity. Nevertheless, this boundary condition
awaits further testing in which motivation levels are manipulated
directly (e.g., with incentives).
Individual differences
An additional potential precondition is individual differences in
RA capacity, a factor that has not yet been examined. Suggestive
evidence comes from Wilhelm and Oberauer (2006)w h o ,i n
an individual differences study, found a correlation between
WM capacity and reaction time. Of interest is the key ﬁnding
in this paper showing that the aforementioned correlation was
signiﬁcantly higher when the reaction time tasks involved an
arbitrary stimulus-response mapping (which presumably would
be held in RA, at least until sufﬁcient practice had accrued)
as compared with a non-arbitrary (and compatible) mapping
in which response identity can be directly retrieved from LTM.
Nonetheless, the authors did not examine performance on the
tasks immediately following the instructions and therefore it is
difﬁcult to tell with certainty if these ﬁndings relate to novel task
representation.
Relevance of the boundary conditions to the null result of Waszak
et al. (2008)
After listing the boundary conditions for plan reﬂexivity, it
becomesclearwhythere wasnoevidence forreﬂexivity inWaszak
et al.’s (2008) study. Speciﬁcally, in their study, there might not
have been sufﬁcient motivation to maintain readiness to react
to stimulus values that never served as targets precisely because
they never served as targets, a fact that could probably have
been detected already at the beginning of the experiment, after
a few dozen trials. Additionally, the limited RA storage capac-
ity might have been exhausted because of rather high cognitive
demand, involving many stimulus-response pairs and two tasks.
Finally, the measurement of reﬂexivity was performed outside
the plan-to-execution event. Speciﬁcally, when the task-rule con-
gruency effect was assessed in the color task (for example), it
reﬂected the readiness to execute the shape task, but the shape
task was executed in other trials and thus belonged to different
events.
PROCEDURAL VS. DECLARATIVE WM
W h i l ew ea d o p t e dOberauer’s (2001, 2002) model, more recently,
Oberauer (2010) further suggested that WM has two dis-
tinct compartments with analogous structure, procedural WM
and declarative WM. Our description of WM subcompo-
nents accords well with Oberauer’s (2010) characterization of
declarative WM. However, Oberauer’s (2010) characterization of
proceduralWMindicatesthatPRbehaviorsarerelated tothepro-
cedural compartment and not the declarative compartment. We
think that given the current knowledge, it is difﬁcult to decide
whether a separate procedural WM exists, although the avail-
able evidence seems to favor a domain-general view rather than a
distinction between two WM systems. One line of evidence con-
cerns individual differences in WM and reaction times (assuming
that reaction times are related to procedural WM). Speciﬁcally,
Schmiedek et al. (2007) tested participants with various declara-
tive WM measures and also tested them on choice reaction time
tasks, all involving arbitrary stimulus-response mapping. Using
a structural equations modeling approach which permits esti-
mation of correlations between latent variables (as opposed to
observed measures), these authors found a strong correlation
(r = 0.90)between anaspectofthereactiontimedistributionand
WM. Wilhelm and Oberauer (2006) results, described before-
hand, lead to a similar conclusion. Along a similar line, Hartstra
et al. (2011) who examined the brain areas involved in the rep-
resentation of novel instructions found that the very same brain
region (left lateral PFC) subserved novel task instructions and
the storage of novel object-color associations. These results sup-
port a domain-general view rather than a separation between
procedural and declarative WM.
POSSIBLE NEURO-COGNITIVE MECHANISMS
A theoretical framework that can potentially explain the differ-
ence between novel and practiced plans is the dual-mechanisms
of control account developed by Braver et al. (2007, 2009; Braver,
2012). This framework distinguishes between two modes of cog-
nitive control: proactive and reactive. The proactive control mode
involves preparatory activation and sustained maintenance of
goal-related information triggered by advance contextual cues
(i.e., taskinstructions). Itcontrasts with reactive control,i n v o l vi n g
transient, stimulus-triggered retrieval of goal-related informa-
tion that is based on conﬂict detection or bottom-up associative
links. Importantly, prior work has demonstrated variability or
ﬂexibility in these control modes, linked to (sometimes subtle)
features of the task or stimuli, as well as stable individual dif-
ferences (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012). This variability has
been detected in terms of brain activity dynamics, using fMRI
methods. Thus, under task conditions preferentially associated
with proactive control, anticipatory and sustained intention-
related activity has been observed in the lateral PFC. In contrast,
under conditions involving reactive control, activity was tran-
sient, stimulus-triggered and involved not only the lateral PFC,
but also brain regions associated with conﬂict detection (i.e.,
anterior cingulate cortex) and episodic/associative retrieval (i.e.,
lateral parietal cortex, anterior PFC, and medial temporal lobes).
Additionally, other work has suggested that proactive control is
preferentially engaged for the preparation of action-intentions,
i.e. plans (vs. preparatory attention; Ruge et al., 2009, 2010).
The dual-mechanisms of control framework, therefore, suggest
that the critical difference between proactive and reactive con-
trol is not just which brain regions are engaged, but moreover the
temporal dynamics of activation. Here, we further suggest that
plan novelty might also be a potential key feature that promotes
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proactive control, whereas practiced plans might rely more on
reactive control. Onereasonwhythis maybesois thatperforming
a novel task requires sustained binding of the task elements (see
below) and thus RA. However, dealing with familiar tasks may
be performed “on the ﬂy” by retrieving the already stored bind-
ing of task elements. This view predicts that novel plans would be
associated with increased anticipatory (i.e., prior to plan imple-
mentation) activation within lateralPFC,whereaspracticedplans
should be associated with greater transient post-stimulus activa-
tion (in these and other regions). This would be in line with the
idea thatnovel plans are in astronger PR type state than practiced
plans.
Only very few studies have compared novel and practiced tasks
directly. Cole et al. (2010) developed a paradigm that enabled
comparison of novel and practiced tasks by permuting a set
of rules into many novel rule combinations (i.e., tasks), creat-
ing a large space of possible tasks (64). The rules used fall into
three categories: semantic (e.g., “is it green?”), decision (e.g., “is
the answer to both words the same?”), and response (e.g., “if
true, press your left index ﬁnger”). Thus, one of the 64 tasks
could be, “If the answer to “is it green?” is the same for both
words then press your left index ﬁnger.” By utilizing 64 differ-
ent tasks, it is possible to obtain reliable estimates of novel task
learning, by examining ﬁrst-trial performance on each of the
tasks. Further, a subset of the 64 tasks is extensively practiced,
such that novel and practiced tasks can be directly compared
while controlling for the particular stimuli and rules used. Cole
et al. found (using functional MRI; fMRI) that practiced task
preparation activated the anterior PFC ﬁrst, then the dorsolat-
eral PFC. In contrast, they found a reversal of this pattern for
novel tasks, suggesting that practiced tasks involve a top-down
task set retrieval (from LTM) process, while novel tasks involve
a bottom-up task set formation process. Thus, it was the pattern
of relationship between the lateral PFC and other brain regions
(anterior PFC, in this case) that distinguished between practiced
and novel tasks, somewhat in line with Braver et al.’s distinction
between proactive and reactive control. Using a variety of tasks
with unique visual stimuli, Ruge and Wolfensteller (2010)a l s o
observed that PFC (among other regions) was involved in novel
task learning.
Continuing this line of investigation, Cole et al. (2011)u s e d
multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data to identify the pres-
ence of speciﬁc rules within PFC. They found that PFC activity
patterns associated with speciﬁc rules during practice were also
present during novel task preparation and execution. This sug-
gests that the PFC gains much of its ﬂexibility by rigidly applying
o l db u th i g h l yp r a c t i c e da c t i v i t yp a t t e r n st on o v e lc o n t e x t s .T h e
present review suggests that rigidity may be a general feature
of highly prepared states rather than being restricted to the
application of familiar rules.
In a related study, Gilbert et al. (2012) used a similar analy-
sis approach to examine the content of delayed intentions. They
observed a sustained, intention-related increase in anterior PFC
activity, and increased connectivity of this region with posterior
cortex regions that showed content-speciﬁc representation. This
suggests a potentially interactive model, in which sustained PFC
input may be needed to shift posterior cortex representations
fromthe ALTM to RA componentofWM oralternatively, to bind
the novel pattern of LTM representations in posterior cortex, in
accordance with how we deﬁned RA.
Our notion concerning reﬂexivity of novel plans may seem
counterintuitive. Nonetheless, it accords with current theorizing
concerning the nature of PFC representations. Speciﬁcally, these
representations are described as being highly ﬂexible in the sense
of representing any novel combination of familiar elements (e.g.,
O’Reilly et al., 1999; Miller and Cohen, 2001). However, PFC rep-
resentations arealsobelievedtobehighlyresistantto interference.
What we suggest is that this resistance to interference comes at
the cost of losing online ﬂexibility. In this regard, incorporat-
ing rapid contextual changes into the existing RA representation
may require the formation of an entirely new representation
(cf. Kessler and Meiran, 2006, 2008) This new activation-based
RA representation is likely fragile (i.e., incoming activity can
destroy it), and so it is “locked in” to reduce interference, mak-
ingussomewhatlessresponsive toimmediate contextualchanges.
Consistent with this idea, Duncan (2010) suggested that encod-
ing in PFC (and other brain regions which form the Multiple
Demand network) is based on the pattern of neuronal acti-
vation. He further argues that when the represented content
changes, so does the pattern of neuronal activation. Similarly,
O’Reilly et al. (2003) suggested a coarse and distributed coding
system. Since the neurons in this coding scheme encode con-
junctions of elements, a change in the context seems to again
require a change in activation over many neurons. Singer and
Gray (1995) and others suggest that novel representations con-
sist of synchronous neuronal ﬁring, which, for WM representa-
tions is presumably supported by the PFC (e.g., Ruchkin et al.,
2003). Updating such a representation seems to require gener-
ating a new pattern of synchronous activity. Braver and Cohen
(2000) suggest that PFC representations are updated only on spe-
ciﬁc occasions, determined by the dopamine-controlled gating
system, again implying that there are periods in which represen-
tations cannot be updated. Regardless of the differences, all of
the theories suggest that RA-based representations, while being
extremely ﬂexible in the sense that they can be entirely novel
combinations of elements, are inﬂexible in their responsiveness
to rapid contextual changes in the environment, which accord-
ing to the present thesis is what characterizes intention-based
reﬂexivity.
CONCLUSIONS
In this brief review, we have presented evidence that the inten-
t i o nt oc a r r yo u tas i m p l ep l a ni nt h en e a rf u t u r em a yr e s u l t
in paradoxical loss of control, such that the intended plan may
be (at least partly) executed prematurely and inappropriately.
We distinguished between two types of plans based on the WM
compartment that is probably used for their storage. Planning
to execute a familiar task may be entirely based on ALTM, thus
preserving the scarce RA capacity resources. However, when the
plan is novel, aspects of it are probably represented in RA.
We further showed that different boundary conditions apply
to the reﬂexivity of novel and practiced plans and suggested
the likely neuro-cognitive mechanisms that are being involved.
We thus conclude that plan reﬂexivity provides clues as to the
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mechanism underlying the mind’s tremendous ﬂexibility dur-
ing preparation. It seems that whatever mechanism gives us
this gift of mental ﬂexibility to allow for rapid novel planning
also takes away ﬂexibility as a new plan is prepared to be
executed.
The hypotheses that we outlined in this paper lead to many
future research directions that stem from currently unresolved
questions, such as: is plan reﬂexivity a (perhaps unwanted) side-
effect of planning or is it (also) associated with beneﬁts? In this
regard, Gollwitzer (1999) suggested that reﬂexive plans are more
likely to get successfully executed, in part because of reduced
dependence on endogenous control inputs. (This hypothesis is
still hotly debated, e.g., see Brandstätter et al., 2001; Smith, 2003
vs. e.g., McDaniel and Scullin, 2010.) Additionally, despite the
relatively clear evidence that novel and practiced tasks are sub-
served by different patterns of brain activity, it is unclear at
present whether these differential patterns are related to plan
reﬂexivity. Finally, while we suggested that plan reﬂexivity is a
feature of proactive control, this is merely a speculation at this
point and further research is needed to provide direct support
for it.
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